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mined solely from levy of execution or filing of an order and not
from the use of other enforcement devices. This variance, however,
would not affect the result in the instant case since the ranking of
Neilson's judgment was not involved.
The practitioner should note with interest the fact that among
all the outstanding liens attached to the fund, the attorney's fee
had priority. Neilson, in fact, conceded that the attorney was to be
paid before all the other claimants. It appears that the rationale
for this approach lies in the fact that it was the attorney's efforts
which brought the MVAIC fund into existence. The
situation is
2 11
analogous to the priority given to a mechanic's lien.
Finally, in regard to the assignments of the proceeds of the
personal injury action, the court noted that they did not violate the
prohibition against the assignment of a personal injury cause of
action. 2 2 The priority among the assignments was determined by
the date of making, the earlier one having priority. Thus, by
virtue of these statutory liens and assignments, the debtor had
effectively and completely disassociated himself from the MVAIC
fund, leaving no debt available to Neilson.
The decision is illustrative of the broad plenary powers given
the court in a CPLR 5227 special proceeding 13
CPLR 5231: Form over substance-orsubstance over form?
Recently, the courts of this state were presented with the
following situation. In essence, the petitioner recovered a judgment
in the New York City Civil Court against defendants who lived
within the city but were employed beyond its limits. An income
execution was delivered to the enforcing officer but was returned
unsatisfied. Thereafter, a transcript of the judgment was issued
out of the civil court and filed with a county clerk. An income
execution was then served on the employer by the sheriff in a
county beyond New York City.
In Schleimer v. Gross,"4 the court refused to order the sheriff
to accept and serve an income execution upon the employer. In
so doing, the court noted that under Section 701(a) of the New
York City Civil Court Act, the authority of the enforcing officer to
serve an income execution is limited to the city of New York. In
addition, under section 702 of the same act once the judgment or
transcript is issued out of the civil court and filed with the county
clerk, only a sheriff can enforce it (as though it were rendered by
the supreme court). As a consequence of these provisions, the
211
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supreme court held that the attempted service on the debtors in
New York City by the civil court's enforcing officer was a nullity.
The court reasoned that in order to serve the income execution
on the employer under these circumstances, it would be necessary
to attempt service again on the debtor, this time by its own enforcing
officer (the sheriff), and upon the inability to do so or the debtor's
default, then to serve the employer. In essence, the procedure
specified in CPLR 5231 would have to be followed to the letter
without regard to the income execution attempted by the civil
court's enforcing officer.
In conflict with this decision is Republic Associates, Inc. v.
McRae,215 wherein the court rejected the above stated procedure
and gave full effect to the attempted income execution of the civil
court's enforcing officer on the debtor and ordered its sheriff to
serve the employer directly. The court reasoned that the action of
the civil court's enforcing officer in attempting to serve the debtor
was to be deemed the action of the sheriff within the meaning of
CPLR 5231.
The Republic case appears to offer a more desirable result for
several reasons. First, the purpose of requiring the debtor to be
served before his employer is to give the debtor an opportunity to
satisfy the judgment before the employer learns about it. 2 16 This
purpose was fulfilled by the attempt made by the civil court's
enforcing officer and to repeat this procedure seems to place form
over substance. In addition, since the civil court's enforcing
officer may in any instance be either a marshal or a sheriff,217 it is
possible that under Schleimer's holding, the same individual acting
as sheriff would be required to perform duplicate acts merely because
the initial income execution issued out of the civil court. The court
in Republic appeared to appreciate this possibility since it placed
great stress on the general powers, duties, and liabilities of
marshals 218 in holding that a marshal's action was to be deemed
that of a sheriff within the meaning of CPLR 5231.
This interpretation does not alter the established law which
holds any civil court execution issued to a sheriff outside the city
of New York to be void.2"9 The civil court's execution in Republic
was proper. It was also, however, unsatisfied. Republic only held
that the condition precedent existing under CPLR 5231, as to giving
a debtor an opportunity to satisfy the judgment before notice was
21546

Misc. 2d 1098, 261 N.Y.S.2d 777 (Sup. Ct Westchester County

1965).

2167B McK(UNEY's

CPLR 5222, supp. commentary 23 (1965); see 6
KoRN & MIxum,
Naw Yoy CIVIL PRAcncIC
5231.16 (1965).
217 N.Y. CITY CrviL CouRT Acr § 701(a).
21 8
See N.Y. CITy CivIL CoURT AcT § 1609.
219
American Metal Climax, Inc. v. Seaboard Die Casting Corp., 43 Misc.
2d 781, 252 N.Y.S.2d 475 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1964).
WIsnTam,

1966 ]

BIANNUAL SURVEY

given to his employer, was fulfilled by the civil court's enforcing
officer, so that the supreme court's enforcing officer was not required
to repeat the process.
ARTICLE 57- APPEALS TO THE APPELLATE DIVISIoN
CPLR 5701: Order denying motion to dismiss after jury fails to
return a verdict held not appealable.
In Covell v. H.R.H. Constr. Corp.,2 0 after the jury failed to
return a verdict, the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint
was denied by the trial court. The defendant then appealed from
the order denying the motion, but the appellate division refused to
entertain the appeal. In refusing to allow the appeal of a denial of
a motion to dismiss upon failure of the jury to return a verdict,
the court noted that it recognized an alleged change in the CPLR
deleting the specific authority for such appeal. Normally, there
would be no adverse effect from such a holding, since the movant
could appeal from a final judgment. However, there will be no
final judgment in a case where the jury fails to return a verdict,
and thus, any appeal of a possibly erroneous order becomes effectively blocked. The disposition of this case turns upon the CPLR's
failure to incorporate into CPLR 5701(a) the last sentence of
CPA § 457-a, despite advice to do so by the Advisory Committee
on Practice and Procedure. 221 CPA § 457-a provided that "in the
event a verdict was not returned an appeal may be taken from the
order denying a motion for judgment .. *"222 The omission has
been said 22to3 be a mere inadvertence with no intention to change
prior law.
Furthermore, CPLR 5701(a) (2) grants appeals as of right
where the order involves some part of the merits or affects a substantial right.224 It is contended that the denial of a motion to
dismiss after the jury has failed to return a verdict does affect a
substantial right since the parties must now go through a new trial
necessitated by the failure of a jury verdict.
This appeal for the purpose of protecting defendant's substantial right of appeal of a question of law should have been allowed
by a liberal interpretation of CPLR 5701(a). Furthermore, if the
omission of CPA § 457-a in the CPLR was a mere inadvertence,
the court should have "read in" such a right to appeal, especially
220 24 App. Div. 2d 566, 262 N.Y.S.2d 370 (2d Dep't 1965).
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